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THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 2
This article describes how the SEC’s posi-
tion on hedge clauses has evolved in light of 
the IAA’s anti-fraud provisions, culminating in 
the 2007 no-action letter of Heitman Capital 
Management, LLC,4 which granted new and 
unexpected leeway to advisers. In Heitman 
Capital, the SEC stated that it would no 
longer provide no-action guidance on hedge 
clauses; therefore, the only avenue for further 
development of the law in this area is in the 
courts or SEC enforcement actions.
Although hedge clauses have been raised 
by plaintiffs in a number of  cases, there has 
only been one case with a published opinion 
that addresses the effect hedge clauses have 
on a contract between an investment adviser 
and its advisee. The Ninth Circuit, in the 
recent case of  Hsu v. UBS Financial Services, 
Inc.,5 has allowed an investment adviser to 
legally disclaim its liability – or create the 
perception in the mind of  the advisee that 
the  adviser has disclaimed its liability – for 
the actions of  an investment manager to 
whom the investment adviser refers an advi-
see. This is a surprising outcome because 
recommending an investment manager can 
constitute investment advice under the IAA,6 
and the disclaimer of  liability for the rec-
ommended manager’s actions is arguably 
inconsistent with the recommending adviser’s 
broad fiduciary duties.7
The SEC has relied upon two IAA provi-
sions in developing its position on hedge 
clauses. The first is Section 206, the anti-fraud 
provisions, and the second is Section 215, 
the provision voiding certain illegal advisory 
contracts. Sections 206(1) and 206(2) make it 
unlawful for an investment adviser “to employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any 
client or prospective client,” and/or to “engage 
in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates as a fraud or deceit upon 
any client or prospective client,” respectively.8 
Section 215(a) provides that “any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person 
to waive compliance with any provision of 
this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or 
order thereunder shall be void.”9
The SEC’s first statement on hedge clauses 
came in a 1951 Opinion of  the General 
Counsel.10 The hedge clauses addressed 
in the general counsel’s opinion related to 
literature used by both broker-dealer and 
investment advisers containing recommenda-
tions or information on particular securities. 
Such publications contained statements to 
the effect “that the information furnished is 
obtained from sources believed to be reliable 
but that no assurance can be given as to its 
accuracy,” with occasionally added language 
“to the effect that no liability is assumed with 
respect to such information.” Concerned that 
a hedge clause would “create in the mind of 
the investor a belief  that he has given up legal 
rights and is foreclosed from a remedy which 
he might otherwise have either at common 
law or under the” federal securities laws, the 
general counsel opined that a hedge clause or 
similar provision violates Section 206’s anti-
fraud provisions (and other SEC statutes) if  it 
“is likely to lead an investor to believe that he 
has in any way waived any right of action he 
may have.”11
Over time, the hedge clause language was 
generalized by broker-dealers and investment 
advisers to contracts with advisees beyond 
the literature context. The added language 
disclaiming liability mentioned in the general 
counsel’s opinion is what the SEC has focused 
on in a series of no-action letters and enforce-
ment actions.
Until 2007, the SEC through a series of 
no-action letters and enforcement actions took 
a very restrictive position on what a permis-
sible hedge clause was. Essentially, in the 
no-action letters described in this article, the 
SEC reasoned that the antifraud provisions 
of the IAA contained in Sections 206(1) and 
206(2) were violated any time a hedge clause 
attempted to limit investment adviser liability 
for negligence or malfeasance by using such 
adjectives as “gross” or “willful” to qualify 
what type of investment adviser negligence 
or malfeasance might trigger liability to an 
advisee. In 2007, the SEC issued a no-action 
letter to Heitman Capital Management, LLC, 
which marked a turn in the SEC’s position and 
declared, for the first time, that such qualifi-
cations are not per se violations of Sections 
206(1) and 206(2). Rather, the Heitman Capital 
no-action letter announced that whether a 
particular hedge clause is “mislead[ing] [as to] 
any particular Client” can only be answered 
by a “ fact-intensive…inquiry” that focuses 
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on a particular advisee’s “particular circum-
stances,” the “relationship and communica-
tions between” the investment adviser and 
the advisee, and “the form and content of the 
hedge clause.”12
It was not until the 1970s that the SEC 
first began to give some content to the 1951 
opinion of its general counsel. In various no-
actions letters, the SEC separately rejected 
attempts to disclaim investment adviser liabil-
ity for “ordinary negligence,”13 to limit such 
liability to “gross negligence or willful mal-
feasance,”14 and to limit such liability to “acts 
done in bad faith.”15 The SEC has pointed 
out that the use of adjectives to qualify liabil-
ity for negligence or malfeasance may violate 
Section  206 because there may be situations 
where applicable law requires a greater degree 
of care by a fiduciary, and that, accordingly, 
the agreement should at the least state that 
the advisor was not disclaiming liability for 
“violation[s] of applicable law.”16 One way 
used by an investment adviser to clarify such 
waivers has been to include a statement to the 
effect that an advisee has not waived his rights 
under the federal securities law or state law. 
The SEC has made clear that reference merely 
to the federal securities laws is not adequate.17
Even such a non-waiver statement was not 
necessarily adequate in the SEC’s view, how-
ever. As the SEC understood fiduciary law, an 
advisee “may have a right of action under fed-
eral and state law even where his adviser has 
acted in good faith.”18 The SEC pointed out in 
one no-action letter that the combination of a 
non-waiver statement with a disclaimer of an 
investment adviser’s liability for gross or will-
ful conduct might lead an “unsophisticated” 
advisee to believe it had no legal rights for any 
actions undertaken by an investment adviser.19
The SEC has never addressed the issue of 
whether exculpatory clauses other than those 
discussed to this point might be permissible. 
But the State of Connecticut has done so 
when it stated in a release that exculpatory 
provisions relieving an investment adviser of 
its “liability for losses caused by conditions 
and events beyond its control such as war, 
strikes, natural disasters, new government 
restrictions, market fluctuations, communica-
tions disruptions, etc. … are acceptable since 
they do not attempt to limit or misstate the 
adviser’s fiduciary obligations to its clients.”20 
This conclusion is consistent with the reason-
ing behind the SEC’s no-action letters.
In addition to the above-cited no-action 
letters, the SEC has instituted three enforce-
ment actions that penalized advisors for 
using hedge clauses, among other violations, 
although none of these actions provide much 
additional guidance on what makes a hedge 
clause problematic. In the two earliest actions 
from 1979 and 1981, the SEC did not describe 
the content of the hedge clause or why it was 
objectionable.21 In 1994, the SEC brought 
an enforcement action alleging, among other 
violations, that the adviser’s agreements con-
tained a paragraph purporting to limit the 
adviser’s liability to “gross negligence or will-
ful misconduct,” although the SEC still pro-
vided no explanation of why the hedge clause 
was problematic.22
There also is a well-developed body of 
state administrative law adopting the SEC’s 
approach to limitations on hedge clauses 
and applying it to state registered investment 
advisers.23 In part, this is a function of the 
fact that many state securities laws governing 
investment advisers are modeled on the IAA24 
and in part a function of the fact that the anti-
fraud provisions of Section 206 of the IAA are 
not limited to investment advisers registered 
with the SEC.
The “hedge clause” doctrine and the 1951 
general counsel’s opinion have been cited by 
the SEC in other areas of investment adviser 
regulation where, in the SEC’s view, an advisee 
might be misled into believing that he or she 
had no rights arising from the fiduciary duties 
owed by an investment adviser to its advisees. 
For example, in a 1984 no-action letter Robert 
D. Brown Investment Counsel, Inc.,25 the SEC 
stated that a provision in a year-to-year advi-
sory contract providing that the advisee could 
only elect to terminate the contract once a 
year (on the contract’s anniversary) was fraud-
ulent and deceptive under the IAA. The fidu-
ciary relationship between investment adviser 
and advisee was built on confidence, the SEC 
explained, and, if  that confidence was lost, a 
provision in the contract requiring the further 
rendering of services, even if  they were not 
satisfactory, raised “serious questions” under 
the IAA’s anti-fraud provisions. The SEC 
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stated that a provision denying a client’s right 
to terminate the contract was invalid because 
“the contract might lead the client to believe 
that he is not entitled to terminate the contract 
when fiduciary principles indicate that he has 
that right.”26
Based on the SEC’s actions, and especially 
the no-action letters, one could have read the 
agency’s position on hedge clauses to be very 
restrictive in setting limits on the contrac-
tual rights of an investment adviser and its 
advisee to negotiate disclaimers of liability. 
But this is not what the SEC’s current posi-
tion is on hedge clauses, as it made clear in a 
seminal 2007 no-action letter, Heitman Capital 
Management, LLC.27 Heitman Capital sought 
guidance on a hedge clause in which an advi-
see indemnified Heitman Capital and other 
investment advisers affiliated with Heitman 
Capital, except for “grossly negligent, reck-
less, willfully improper or illegal conduct in its 
performance;” actions “outside the scope of 
[the] Manager’s authority;” or “other material 
breach under” the advisory contract. In addi-
tion to this hedge clause, the agreement also 
contained a “non-waiver of rights” provision: 
“Notwithstanding the foregoing,” nothing in 
the agreement was to constitute a waiver of 
any of the client’s “legal rights under appli-
cable [US] federal securities law or any other 
laws whose applicability is not permitted to be 
contractually waived.”
In its letter to the SEC, Heitman Capial 
asserted that its clients were primarily 
 institutional investors such as large pension 
funds that were “sophisticated persons that 
have the resources and experience to under-
stand the investment advisory agreements 
with the applicable Heitman Advisor, and the 
bargaining power to negotiate, and in some 
cases even dictate, the terms of the invest-
ment advisory agreements.” In addition, some 
Heitman Capital investment advisers provided 
advice to wrap account and certain com-
mingled fund entities that were represented by 
financial intermediaries with allegedly similar 
levels of sophistication and bargaining power. 
Heitman Capital also contended that most 
of these financial intermediaries had a sepa-
rate responsibility to negotiate with Heitman 
Capital in the best interests of their underly-
ing clients and assist their clients in evaluating 
the advisory agreement, including the hedge 
clause and non-waiver disclosure.
The SEC’s Division of  Investment 
Management’s response noted Heitman 
Capital’s representations, and reiterated the 
general principle that whether an advisor’s 
hedge clause purporting to limit adviser lia-
bility to acts of gross negligence or willful 
malfeasance violates Section 206 depends on 
all of the “surrounding facts and circum-
stances.” In this analysis, the SEC wrote that 
it would consider (1) “the form and content” 
of the particular hedge clause, “e.g., its accu-
racy,” (2) communications between the adviser 
and the client about the hedge clause, and 
(3)  the particular circumstances of the client. 
Where a client was “unsophisticated” in the 
law, the SEC asserted, relevant factors would 
include whether the hedge clause was “written 
in plain English,” “individually highlighted 
and explained during an in-person meeting,” 
and whether “enhanced disclosure” was pro-
vided to explain when a client may still have a 
right of action.28
In light of these general principles and 
Heitman Capital’s factual representations, 
the SEC’s response indicated that Heitman 
Capital’s use of a hedge clause and non-waiver 
disclosure “would not per se violate sections 
206(1) and 206(2) of the [IAA].”29 The no-
action letter emphasized, however, that the 
SEC was taking no position and could give 
no assurance on whether this Heitman Capital 
advisory agreement was misleading (and there-
fore illegal) as applied to any particular client 
“because of the fact-intensive nature of the 
inquiry.”30
In its no-action request, Heitman Capital 
relied on an interpretation of state law, including 
that of New York, to the effect that agreements 
relieving a party of liability for its negligence 
will be enforced. Although the SEC made no 
mention of this interpretation in its response, 
this type of reasoning is implicit in the SEC’s 
statement that a hedge clause and non-waiver 
disclosure of the type used by the Heitman 
Capital investment advisers are not per se viola-
tions of the IAA. In other words, in the SEC’s 
view, such limitations of liability are appar-
ently permitted if the normal standards for 
modifying fiduciary duties, full disclosure and 
informed consent by the beneficiary,31 are met.
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As the SEC indicated in Heitman Capital 
that it would not be issuing further no-action 
or interpretive assurances under Sections 
206(1) or 206(2) of the IAA regarding an 
adviser’s use of any particular hedge clause, 
the only places in which further developments 
can occur are SEC enforcement actions or 
court cases brought either by the SEC or advi-
sees themselves. Since Heitman Capital, there 
have been no SEC enforcement actions on the 
subject. One published case briefly mentions 
a hedge clause issue but was decided on other 
grounds,32 and there are a handful of cases in 
which the issue has been raised in the plead-
ings but that have not resulted in any sort of 
decisions or orders in which the issue has been 
discussed.33 There has been, however, one 
published case substantively treating hedge 
clauses: Hsu v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.34
In Hsu, the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the district court determination that 
the plaintiff  failed to state a claim under IAA 
when he contended that UBS had used an 
illegal hedge clause in its contracts with him 
and other clients.35 The Hsu decisions reflect a 
failure by the plaintiff  to clearly connect UBS’ 
fiduciary obligations as an investment adviser, 
which it became by recommending a list of 
investment managers to its advisees, to its 
disclaimer of liability for the actions of these 
investment managers it recommends.
The plaintiff  in Hsu was an individual 
investor advisee who was seeking class cer-
tification for similarly situated advisees. He 
had entered into a contract to participate in 
UBS’ “wrap” fee program, which consisted of 
investment advisory, execution, clearing and 
custodial services for a single fee. Under the 
arrangement, the plaintiff  was provided the 
opportunity to select an investment manager 
for his wrap fee arrangement, and given a 
list of potential investment managers for this 
purpose by UBS. Interestingly, while the wrap 
fee provisions and list that UBS provided to 
the plaintiff  purported to be only a recom-
mended list of permissible advisers – that is, 
the advisee was free to select an investment 
manager other than from the UBS list – the 
plaintiff  attached to his complaint what alleg-
edly were UBS’ internal guidelines indicating 
that the advisee must select someone from the 
UBS pre-approved list.36 The plaintiff  selected 
Horizon Asset Management Services, LLC 
(Horizon) as its investment manager from the 
list that UBS provided. The basis for the plain-
tiff ’s complaint was UBS’ apparent disclaimer 
of liability for the third-party investment man-
ager Horizon’s actions.
The plaintiff  sought rescission of the wrap 
fee contracts and “restitution [from UBS] 
for sums paid to defendant by all class mem-
bers.” To show that UBS unlawfully limited its 
liability, plaintiff ’s main argument was based 
on a comparison of the language describing 
the wrap fee program and UBS’ obligations 
to advisees in different provisions of the sub-
ject contract and a brochure describing the 
program. On the one hand, plaintiff  noted, 
the wrap fee account disclosure stated that 
UBS was plaintiff ’s “investment advisor” with 
a “fiduciary relationship” to plaintiff, and 
subject to the legal standards of the IAA. 
On the other hand, plaintiff  pointed out, the 
contract contained a hedge clause with respect 
to the third-party investment manager: UBS, 
the contract stated, “may or may not have 
researched” the investment manager plaintiff  
selected.37 In addition, the contract stated 
that UBS “shall not be liable for and Client 
agrees to hold UBS Financial Services Inc. 
harmless against all losses to Client for any 
error of judgment, mistake of law, negligence, 
willful misfeasance, or bad faith on the part of 
the Investment Manager or any other matter 
within the Investment Manager’s control such 
as … compliance with applicable law.”
The district court granted UBS’ motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, agree-
ing with UBS that it did not disclaim any 
duties owed to the plaintiff  and that it had 
not required the plaintiff  to waive any rights 
under the IAA.38 Essentially, the district court 
observed, the plaintiff ’s argument was that, 
while the UBS statement that it was a fidu-
ciary and the hedge clause disclaiming liability 
for conduct by Horizon, Hsu’s investment 
manager, may have been clear when read in 
isolation, those two provisions were contra-
dictory and misleading when read together. 
But the hedge clause was not “incongruous” 
with the other terms of the contract, the 
district court held, and, therefore, was not 
deceptive. The district court explained: “The 
contract never disclaimed liability for UBS’s 
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own role as investment advisor [sic]. Rather, 
it disclaimed liability for any misconduct on 
behalf  of Horizon, HSU’s separate investment 
manager.”39
In ruling that UBS was permitted to dis-
claim liability for Horizon’s misconduct 
under these circumstances, the district court’s 
ruling was seemingly vulnerable to appeal. 
Recommendations regarding whether to select 
a particular investment adviser can qualify 
one as an investment adviser under the IAA. 
If  a fiduciary recommends a particular invest-
ment adviser who should not have been rec-
ommended, then there could be a violation 
of the recommender’s fiduciary duties, and 
specifically the recommending fiduciary’s duty 
of care. As an agent, the fiduciary “has a duty 
to the principal to act with the care, compe-
tence, and diligence normally exercised by 
agents in similar circumstances,” and, in evalu-
ating whether that standard has been met, 
“[s]pecial skills or knowledge possessed by 
[the] agent” are to be taken into account.40 On 
the one hand, while fiduciaries are generally 
not deemed “insurers” of a particular result 
or the acts of others,41 the duty of care can 
impose liability for the acts of others, provided 
the  injurious act of the third-party was fore-
seeable and the imposition of liability is fair 
under the circumstances.42 In the investment 
advisory context, it can be argued that the 
damaging actions of another adviser that the 
principal adviser recommends is foreseeable, 
because the principal adviser’s professional 
responsibilities necessarily relate to the advi-
sory services the third-party is to provide to 
the client, and the disclaimer of liability by an 
investment adviser for the actions of another 
investment manager whom the adviser recom-
mends seems potentially inconsistent with 
the investment adviser’s fiduciary obligations. 
Additionally, applying the Heitman Capital 
principles to Hsu, if  UBS had a fiduciary duty 
of care with respect to its selection of recom-
mended investment managers, then it seems 
likely that an advisee could be confused by the 
various exculpatory statements into thinking 
that he or she had no cause of action against 
UBS for its choosing to include specified 
investment managers in its recommended list.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff  
did not expressly argue, and the district court 
did not render a ruling, on whether UBS owed 
a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff  in connection 
with the list of investment managers UBS 
provided. Rather, the district court held that 
there was “no contradiction” between the 
statements that UBS owed a fiduciary duty to 
the plaintiff  and the exculpatory provisions.43 
Implicit in the district court’s conclusion that 
there is no contradiction between the provi-
sions is that UBS and the plaintiff  had the 
contractual power to limit UBS’ fiduciary 
duties to the plaintiff, something which UBS 
had done, as it appears that it took almost 
no responsibility for its list of recommended 
investment managers.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plain-
tiff  in contrast did clearly argue that “the 
recommendation of an investment manager 
to a client generally qualifies as an advisory 
service and is subject to” the IAA.44 UBS 
countered that Hsu “erroneously assumes” 
that UBS engages in investment advisory ser-
vices “merely by providing a list of Investment 
Managers” to clients, and that, “irrespective 
of whether UBS’ mere provision of a list of 
Investment Managers constituted an advi-
sory service,” UBS’ disclaimer of liability for 
Horizon’s conduct did not contradict the other 
contract provisions of UBS fiduciary duties.45
It was UBS’ argument that ultimately pre-
vailed, as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the complaint. In a brief  four 
paragraph decision, not selected for publica-
tion, the court ruled that the plaintiff  failed 
to satisfy Rule 9’s pleading requirement of 
setting forth what is false or misleading about 
a statement, and why it is misleading, and, 
therefore, failed to put UBS on fair notice of 
the claim. According to the Ninth Circuit, 
while the plaintiff  asserted that UBS deceived 
clients by leading them to believe that they 
waived certain “unwaivable fiduciary duties” 
through the hedge clauses, the plaintiff  never 
“identifies or explains what those ‘unwaiv-
able fiduciary duties are’ … HSU’s claim fails 
because the clauses that he points to do 
not waive compliance with any provision of 
the IAA.”46 Judging by the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, it appears that, despite there being 
references by the plaintiff  to UBS’ owing a 
fiduciary duty to plaintiff  based on its list of 
recommended investment managers in both 
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plaintiff ’s opening and reply briefs to the 
Ninth Circuit, the point was lost on the panel.
The Ninth Circuit also refused to consider 
plaintiff ’s argument that, in practice, UBS 
allegedly required clients to use an investment 
manager from the UBS pre-approved list, call-
ing this an argument raised for the first time on 
appeal.47 This is puzzling, however, because the 
plaintiff had cited an internal UBS document 
that ostensibly required that the investment 
manager be on UBS’ pre-approved list, both 
in his complaint and his opposition to UBS’ 
motion to dismiss. While it can be argued from 
the pleadings and opposition to motion to dis-
miss that UBS’ policy requiring the plaintiff to 
select an adviser from the list was not a central 
focal point of the plaintiff’s contention that 
UBS violated the anti-fraud provision (that was 
the language of the hedge clauses themselves), 
the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to consider the argu-
ment works a particularly harsh result, given 
that the plaintiff referenced the point below, 
and its close relation to the hedge clauses and 
fiduciary duty issues raised in the complaint.
On paper, the Hsu plaintiff’s case seemed 
solid under the principles elucidated in 
Heitman Capital: the plaintiff  was not an 
institutional investor, and there were no facts 
suggesting that he was a sophisticated person, 
had any bargaining power to negotiate with 
UBS over the hedge clause, or that the hedge 
clause was ever explained to him by UBS 
or any intermediary. But the Hsu opinions 
reflect the practical difficulty that plaintiffs 
may have in stating claims under the IAA for 
deceptive practices based on hedge clauses. 
In the section of its decision summarizing the 
parties’ respective arguments, the district court 
noted, in a manner suggesting skepticism, that 
the plaintiff was seeking rescission of “‘ all’ of  
UBS’ contracts for this particular ‘wrap’ fee 
program” (emphasis in original). Although 
the district court never gave a ground for its 
skepticism, perhaps it grew out of several facts, 
including some of which UBS pointed out in 
its motion to dismiss or on appeal: plaintiff  
utilized Horizon as his investment manager 
for approximately two-and-one half years in 
the program, never exercising his apparent 
right to switch his investment manager at any 
time;48 and plaintiff never alleged that he was 
“ever actually misled” by the hedge clause or 
anything else into believing that he was actually 
unable to sue UBS for Horizon’s conduct.49
Heitman Capital clarified that disclaimers 
for a variety of conduct such as mere negligence 
are potentially permissible if  the advisee is suf-
ficiently sophisticated and possesses bargaining 
power or is represented by a financial interme-
diary with these qualities. Without regard to 
whom the advisee or the financial intermediary 
is, Hsu allowed a hedge clause disclaiming an 
adviser’s liability for the acts of an investment 
manager that the investment adviser recom-
mends, even though that recommendation in 
itself constitutes investment advice.
Further developments in this area will have 
to await further litigation or SEC enforcement 
actions. But, as the courts have proven to be 
inhospitable venues for complaints about hedge 
clauses, we may be waiting for quite some time.
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